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In Racial Innocence, her historically focused cultural 
study of “scriptive things,” those “items of material 
culture” that allow us to “discover otherwise 
inaccessible evidence of past behaviours” (8), Robin 
Bernstein invites readers to decode the ways that 
artifacts like books, dolls, and advertisements hail(ed) 
their users into a system of ideological racialization. 
Conversing with “thing theorists” like Martin 
Heidegger, Roland Barthes, and Bill Brown (whose 
A Sense of Things, also interested in nineteenth-
century American “things,” makes a surprisingly brief 
appearance in this book), Bernstein also channels 
Louis Althusser when she defines “enscription” as 
“interpellation through a scriptive thing that combines 
narrative with materiality to structure behavior” (77). 
The scriptive things that Bernstein showcases—no 
matter how one is to look at, play with, or cherish 
them—all insist upon one thing: sentimental narratives 
of childhood innocence are distributed along a colour 
line. From slavery until the Civil Rights Movement 
(and likely beyond), only certain children are scripted 
as innocent. Bernstein finds that, predictably, the 
“juvenile . . . of color” is narrated as “unfeeling” and 
therefore as “unchildlike” (35), rendering this figure 
and the subjects it represents “empty of innocence” 
(16). To claim a “sentimental childlike innocence” (6), 
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particularly following the nineteenth-century American 
shift whereby “[c]hildhood was . . . understood not  
as innocent but as innocence itself” (4), seems then  
to extend Jim Crow beyond the physical and into  
the conceptual.
Innocence Lost: Sentimental Materialism and 
Narratives of Childhood, Race, and Use 
There is no doubt that Racial Innocence is a 
provocative, insightful, and bold text that demonstrates 
how important the field of cultural studies is and can 
be. Texts and topics are interwoven with poignant 
commentaries about race and identity in a way that 
insists that Bernstein’s arguments are equally relevant 
to scholars interested in youth narratives and cultures 
as well as those of us working in critical race studies. 
Bernstein is also able to merge literary and cultural texts 
with sociological and historical findings in productive 
ways while hinting at the contemporary relevance of 
both her methodology and her findings. 
Bernstein begins her argument by addressing, 
with a degree of attentiveness perhaps not previously 
ever granted them, black child figures that were 
simultaneously “juvenile yet excluded from the exalted 
status of ‘child’” (35): pickaninnies. The description 
Bernstein offers of this figure outlines an easily 
recognized caricature: images of black youngsters 
with “exaggerated eyes and mouth[s]” devouring 
watermelons or finding mischief should evoke a 
myriad of popular culture references whose contexts 
are shamefully not as dated as we might like them 
to be (34). Pickaninnies, Bernstein impresses upon 
us, are “in all senses of the word, minor” (35), even 
more so because they are “non-child[ren]” (34), since 
the dominant representation of childhood was (and 
continues to be) coded as white. In order to elucidate 
upon this striking claim, Bernstein points squarely at 
the trope of unfeeling pickaninnies who are immune 
to pain as the culprit for their exclusion from the 
category of “child,” insightfully noting that they are 
the “mirror image of both the always-already pained 
African American adult and the ‘childlike Negro’” (36). 
Pickaninny characters, Bernstein implies, are liminal 
figures, unidentifiable because they do not suffer like 
either their black adult or white child counterparts do. 
This is certainly true of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Topsy, 
one of the literary pickaninnies that Bernstein uses to 
confirm her hypothesis, arguing that “Topsy, emptied 
of innocence, became the prototype for the black 
pickaninny”—characters who were so “grotestque 
as to suggest that only white children were children” 
(16). By this definition, we can also see how the label 
of “pickaninny” usefully extends beyond the African 
American context to other racialized youth; I think 
here of Shakespeare’s abused orphan Caliban and 
Emily Brontë’s Heathcliff, who in childhood seemed 
“hardened . . . to ill treatment,” withstanding “blows 
without winking or shedding a tear” (38). It does 
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not escape me that each of these non-children, 
each of these pickaninnies, is originally parentless 
and “adopted” by figures in racially, socially, and 
economically superior positions—a similarity that 
of course implicates the “pickaninny” into more 
contemporary discourses, like those of transnational 
and transracial adoption.
On the one hand, Racial Innocence addresses 
the ways that childhood, innocence, and race are 
inextricably linked in a process that leads to “[t]he libel 
that African American juveniles were invulnerable, did 
not suffer, and were not victims,” thus “defin[ing] them 
out of childhood itself” (42). In this case, innocence is 
racialized in a way that refuses black juveniles the title 
of “child”—a posture that, in recent history, implicitly 
denoted innocence, purity, and goodness. On the 
other hand, however, Bernstein also insists that racial 
innocence is a “form of deflection, a not-knowing or 
obliviousness that can be made politically useful” (41). 
In other words, racial innocence is a version of colour-
blindness, where racial difference is ironically made 
unimportant by highlighting behavioural differences as 
the main factor of Otherness. Bernstein refers to Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin, this time pointing out why the angelic 
martyr, Little Eva, whose moral purity is symbolically 
inextricable from her Aryan whiteness, might sit on 
Uncle Tom’s knee without hesitation (Bernstein 93) 
or befriend, and by extension cure, the “goblin-like” 
Topsy of her pickaninny naughtiness (Stowe 268). 
With Racial Innocence, Bernstein directs our attention 
to such scenes and characterizations in American 
canonical works about race and identity, revealing 
provocative elements that have gone unnoticed 
through the decades.
The caresses shared by Eva and Tom, summarized 
by Bernstein as “codified racially powerful touches” 
(93), are mirrored in some of the scriptive things 
marketed alongside Stowe’s novel. Some of the 
miscellaneous “Tomitudes”—which “involved 
domestic items such as card games, book illustrations, 
handkerchiefs, and figurines” (95)—capture, for 
instance, these touches and their affects, in the forms of 
visible, useable, and most importantly buyable objects. 
Bernstein elaborates:
In one nineteenth-century metal statuette . . . Tom 
inclines toward Eva and encircles her with his arms, 
while Eva balletically arches her back and reaches 
toward Tom’s face and neck. This statuette depicts 
an embrace between Tom and Eva, but many other 
mass-produced goods connect Eva and Tom through 
the body of the consumer. (95)
Bernstein is drawn to this object because it scripts a 
“physical tenderness . . . through a person’s use” of it 
(95); in other words, it is not the depicted scene that 
evokes sentiment, but the way that the owner of the 
statuette uses it, looks at it, displays it, and cherishes 
182 Jeunesse: Young People, Texts, Cultures 5.1 (2013)Jenny Wills
it that scripts its meaning. This is dependent on how the object is 
used. To revere this sculpture, then, is also to revere a sentiment 
of intimacy that both reiterates Little Eva’s racial innocence and 
the way that her racial innocence is made physical through her 
caress. Incidentally, this particular statuette, as I recall, represents 
a scene more intimate than any interracial touching that goes on 
in the source novel. Certainly we hear that Tom “gaze[s] on her as 
an Italian sailor gazes on his image of the child of Jesus” (266), but 
in that scene in the arbour, Tom and Eva do not embrace but sit 
side by side; their intimacy is expressed only through Tom’s free, 
indirect statement that refers to her as “beloved Eva! Fair star of thy 
dwelling!” (270). Even this, we are to understand, is thought but 
never articulated between them.
Much of Bernstein’s book is spent analyzing a variety of 
scriptive things whose calculated uses imply racialized projects 
in the marketing of both goods and ideas. Bernstein reminds us 
that “[s]criptive things . . . issued directions for their manipulation, 
and these movements—when executed compliantly, altered, or 
refused—performed gender, class, and race” (98). Bernstein offers 
the example of a “Tomitude” card game, produced by V. S. W. 
Parkhurst, which featured illustrations of a different character on 
each card. As Bernstein notes, the instructions “‘direct[ed]’ the 
consumer to ‘hold’ Little Eva and Uncle Tom literally to enfold the 
cards within the hands” (95). Images of Little Eva and Uncle Tom 
are literally pressed upon one another, bound in the player’s hand, 
creating what I presume is an even greater suggestion of intimacy. 
The way that the game directions script the individual cards 
amplifies the intimacy that is already exaggerated in the statuette 
of the two characters embracing. 
Much of Bernstein’s 
book is spent analyzing a 
variety of scriptive things 
whose calculated uses 
imply racialized projects 
in the marketing of both 
goods and ideas.
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Not all of the scriptive things that Bernstein 
acknowledges in Racial Innocence are shaped by 
explicit direction as the Parkhurst cards were. In one of 
two chapters about dolls, Bernstein addresses Johnny 
Gruelle’s now ubiquitous Raggedy Ann, a figure whose 
“concatenation of ruralism, patriotism, and nostalgia 
for antebellum America resonated powerfully in 
1915,” when Gruelle first patented her image (148). 
In her effort to insist that Raggedy Ann represents “the 
complicated black-and-whiteness of the face-painted 
minstrel performer . . . that could, depending on the 
circumstances and the audience, reveal or screen out 
knowledge of race, history, and violence,” Bernstein 
cites a number of ways that Raggedy Ann is “saturated  
. . . with racial meanings” (149):
Much as Raggedy Ann’s name conjoined African 
American ragtime music with [James Whitcomb] 
Riley’s Midwestern poetry, her visual attributes 
. . . amalgamated Gruelle’s mother’s childhood 
doll with a minstrel doll called the Golliwogg. 
Gruelle further associated Raggedy Ann with 
blackface when he connected her to the role of 
Topsy as performed in Tom shows. . . . Gruelle 
[also] constructed Raggedy Ann as an imitation of 
and homage to the character of the Scarecrow of 
Oz . . . itself based in and animated by blackface 
minstrelsy. All these ancestors left traces in Raggedy 
Ann. (149)
Setting up her argument, Bernstein offers a historical 
summary of Raggedy Ann, including its literary co-
production as a “book-and-doll combination” (150),1 
a “racial genealogy of cuddly dolls” (153), and a 
summary of the features that Raggedy Ann borrows 
from Topsy, Scarecrow, and the Golliwogg (most 
significant of which would be their “imperviousness to 
pain” and “tendency toward benign mischief” [181]). 
The assumption that Raggedy Ann was not meant 
to express a blend of her white American cuddly 
doll and minstrel blackface antecedents but instead 
an inharmonious clashing of these two worlds is, 
Bernstein argues, evidenced by another scripted thing: 
the two-headed Topsy-Turvy Doll who, depending on 
which way she is flipped, is hiding either an upside-
down black or white visage beneath her bifurcating 
skirt.
It is the combination of Raggedy Ann’s racialized 
origins and her soft body that shapes the problematic 
script of how she was (meant to be) used. Assuming 
that “soft dolls such as Raggedy Ann encouraged 
their owners to take specific actions” (185), Bernstein 
delineates the two ways that children interacted with 
her physically: by cuddling or abusing her. Given that 
Raggedy Ann was marketed as an unbreakable toy, the 
idea that she can withstand violence more insistently 
likens her to the “unfeeling” and “unchildlike” (35) 
pickaninny than her connection with Topsy, the 
Golliwogg, or Scarecrow, therefore solidifying her 
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implied blackness as well as her deferred position as 
a deferred non-child and non-subject. Bernstein links 
the scripted treatment of Raggedy Ann—violated, 
thrown about, and most importantly hung to dry from 
a clothesline—with the literal and symbolic ravaging 
and lynching of black Americans at the height of the 
Jim Crow era. Here again, Bernstein reminds us that 
those objects so familiar in our lives have legacies that 
must be addressed. Bernstein ends this section with a 
statement that, amid so many other potent arguments, 
inflicts the most poignant accusation that summarizes 
her theory on racial innocence. “Raggedy Ann,” she 
explains, “as insensate to pain as any other imagined 
faithful slave, any other pickaninny, enjoys being 
thrown, boiled, wrung out, skinned, and hanged. It’s 
racially innocent fun” (193). 
Since a book wherein the author allocates nearly 
fifty per cent of its analysis to the study of race and 
dolls must at least acknowledge the Clarks’ Doll Test, 
it is not surprising that Bernstein’s final chapter relies 
heavily on the Clarks’ findings (although it is worth 
noting that the Clarks do not make an appearance, 
aside from a brief cameo in the introduction of the 
book, until this point). In the Clarks’ experiments, 
which have since been questioned for the ways 
that the testers insinuated their hypotheses onto the 
subjects by means of loaded and leading questions, 
the conclusion they established was that black 
and white children preferred white baby dolls and 
associated whiteness with “goodness” and “beauty.” 
American white supremacy and white idealism is 
not surprising, regardless of the race, age, or gender 
of the subject questioned. What Bernstein highlights 
importantly, however, are the ways in which the 
black dolls have historically been targets for violence; 
children playing at lynching their black dolls by far 
extends the symbolic hanging of Raggedy Ann or 
even the assumption that a child’s activities were but 
a “recapitula[ion]” of “reality in their play” (211). 
Bernstein argues that black dolls, because of the 
“publicity of doll play[,] enabled children to influence 
each other” (211). Again, Bernstein is direct and 
polemical: “White children, as doll-players, were not 
only repositories and reflectors of racist culture; they 
were its co-producers” (212).
Scripted Wannabes: Bluest Eyes, Black Barbies,  
and Bratz 
Bernstein’s text immediately evokes connections 
to one example of African American literature that 
addresses dolls and race, a work that Bernstein herself 
addresses throughout Racial Innocence: Toni Morrison’s 
The Bluest Eye. This forty-year-old novel offers a 
representation of black girlhood that explores, among 
other things, the significance of objects of play in 
connection to the development of black subjectivity. 
Known to challenge simplistic readings of African 
American identity, Morrison acknowledges and 
185Jeunesse: Young People, Texts, Cultures 5.1 (2013) Jenny Wills
contradicts the Clarks’ findings in her first novel. 
This book, which, more than any of Morrison’s other 
works, is firmly focused on the complexities of black 
childhood in the United States, addresses the ways 
that children’s toys, merchandise, entertainment, and 
food are consumed by youth of differing racial and 
class positions. Early in the novel, Claudia MacTeer, 
Morrison’s black child narrator, describes how she is 
“revolted by and secretly frightened of [the] round 
moronic eyes, the pancake face, and orangeworms 
hair” on the Raggedy Ann dolls she quickly learns to 
avoid (20). Claudia claims that she resists the script set 
out for her, which outlines what she was “expected 
to do with the doll,” because she has no interest in 
feigning motherhood (20). If we follow Bernstein’s 
argument in Racial Innocence, however, we might 
also read Claudia’s abhorrence of Raggedy Ann as 
a reaction against the implied minstrelsy of the doll 
as well as its scripted violence that, by extension, 
implicates how Claudia herself might be abused and 
how her childhood might be infinitely deferred (or 
denied) as something that is negated by her blackness. 
Given that Claudia is susceptible to abuse by adults 
and white(r) children throughout the novel, her 
rejection of Raggedy Ann might have more to do with 
what the doll stands in for and can be used as, than 
with its grotesque appearance. 
Claudia is also “bemused” by the blue-eyed baby 
dolls she is given, which are scripted as exclusive, 
valuable, and beautiful possessions. Bernstein herself 
addresses this scene in Morrison’s novel, pointing  
out that Claudia hints at how she is scripted by  
“[a]dults, older girls, shops, magazines, newspapers, 
[and] windowsigns” to cherish her “blue-eyed, yellow-
haired, pink-skinned doll” (20), but she finds an 
alternative way to interact with it (Bernstein 29). Rather 
than treasuring an object that embodies a beauty 
aesthetic so unreflective of her own appearance, 
Claudia dissects her doll, dismembering it to “see of 
what it was made, to discover the dearness, to find the 
beauty, the desirability” (20). With a tactic she would 
come to employ in her later novels as well, Morrison 
crafts a protagonist who gestures toward the stereotype, 
the script, the expectation, and then protests the 
simplicity of those assumptions. Here, Claudia 
undermines the Clarks’ findings when she rejects the 
white baby doll out of both jealousy and distrust. 
Moreover, following Bernstein’s suggestion that there 
is a tradition of violating black dolls that is both an 
antecedent to and consequence of what is presumed 
to be black children’s imperviousness to pain, here we 
see the constructedness of that Otherness that renders 
certain dolls (and the children they represent) devoid 
of feeling. In other words, as Claudia decimates the 
“hard unyielding” and “bone-cold” white baby doll, 
which offers the “sweet and plaintive cry ‘Mama,’” as 
she proceeds to “[b]reak off the tiny fingers, bend the 
flat feet, loosen the hair, [and] twist the head around” 
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(21), she is Othering it, deferring it as non-child. In effect, she 
transforms it into what Bernstein would label a pickaninny: 
an unfeeling, non-reactive, impervious thing. When Claudia 
tortures the white baby doll, its routine response makes it the 
unfeeling, unresponsive, unchildlike thing that is so easily denied. 
Thus, because Claudia renders the doll impervious to pain, 
she blackens the doll as a pickaninny and in doing so reverses 
the racialization of the trope. Contrary to Bernstein’s argument 
that the pickaninny is “always of colour” (35), here I think that 
the pickaninny is re-envisioned; I wonder if the pickaninny is 
in fact first and foremost a young subject who is violated and 
disenfranchised, and upon whom race has been importantly (and 
irreversibly) implicated.
It is not until the final pages of Racial Innocence that 
Bernstein tackles the question of how black children play with 
“black dolls [that] had for over a century scripted violent and 
degrading play-performances . . . that labeled African Americans 
as naturally servile and insensate to pain” (234). She mentions 
the doomed National Negro Doll Company, whose efforts to 
erase the connection between scripted violence, black dolls, and 
black youths by producing fragile dolls that insisted on scripted 
reverence predictably became an ironic metaphor for the issues 
the African American community was facing. But the solution 
is not simply to supply African American children with black 
dolls; as Claudia’s behaviour in The Bluest Eye implies, children 
are curious to take apart the images and ideologies repeated in 
scripting beauty as well as violence, in order to understand how 
and why they are working. Replacing black dolls that are scripted 
in one way with black dolls that are scripted in another way does 
. . . children are curious 
to take apart the images 
and ideologies repeated 
in scripting beauty as 
well as violence . . . .
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not—and cannot—resolve the deeply felt anxieties 
and insecurities experienced by children of colour in a 
white supremacist society. 
I wish to conclude this essay with a brief reading, 
through Bernstein’s framework, of some more 
contemporary dolls that are meant to speak to—and 
reflect—North American children of colour in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Notably, the most 
notorious mass-produced dolls in the late twentieth 
century were evidently created as “ethnic alternatives” 
to their white counterparts. These alternative dolls, 
which “come in a rainbow coalition of colours, 
races, ethnicities, and nationalities” (duCille 338), 
are encapsulated by “Black Barbie,” who had a 
handful of precursors and has had many reinventions 
since she first appeared in 1980. Black Francie, an 
African American version of Barbie’s (white) cousin 
Francie—they were made from the same mould—was 
introduced in 1967, followed by Julia in 1968 and 
Cara in 1971. When Black Barbie entered the scene, 
she reflected African American culture and physical 
features in ways that, as Ann duCille points out, 
“raise[d] many difficult questions about difference, 
authenticity, and the problematic categories of the real 
and the symbolic, the typical and the stereotypical” 
(342). Supposedly marketed to children of all racial 
identities, Black Barbie was nonetheless intended to 
celebrate racial and cultural differences, and she has 
enjoyed several incarnations, most recently in the 
form of the “So in Style” collection of six black dolls 
of varying skin tones and hair types. Sharon Raynor 
expresses the psychological significance that Black 
Barbie had on her perceptions of beauty and race, 
extolling the doll’s ability to “blur . . . the lines between 
race, class, and gender because it became a symbol of 
acceptance, identity, and power” (181). 
Certainly, the inclusion of Black Barbie offers 
a level of self-recognition and positive subjectivity 
formation for consumers previously unacknowledged 
by the traditional blond Barbie’s appearance, but 
as many scholars have pointed out, Black Barbie 
“look[s] remarkably like the stereotypical white 
Barbie, modified only by a dash of colour and a 
change of clothes” (duCille 338). Since her official 
inauguration three decades ago, Black Barbie has 
consistently evoked debate for paradoxically repeating 
reductive and fetishistic performances of Otherness 
in combination with thoughtless privileging of white 
beauty norms (through the use of the traditional 
Barbie moulds). Mary F. Rogers explains that, “[o]n 
the one side, one can reduce them to different Others 
who dress distinctively enough to stand out and look 
foreign; on the other side, one can reduce them to 
EuroAmerican wannabes” (52). Essentialist fashionings 
that feature the 1990s dolls Shani, Nichelle, and Asha 
(in the Soul Train collection) wearing kente cloth, 
metallic leopard-print unitards, and displaying “butt 
enhancement[s]” that have been “greatly exaggerated” 
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(duCille 344) are juxtaposed with the “optical 
illusions” of difference that do little beyond darkening 
traditional Barbie’s long, straight hair and changing 
her skin tone. In other words, racial differences are 
undermined while cultural differences are inflated (and 
stereotyped) through the production and packaging 
of this ethnic alternative to the authentic, the real, the 
blond Barbie.2 
In her article “Can the Subaltern Shop?” Lisa 
Guerrero presents the twenty-first-century offering, by 
MGA Entertainment, of the Bratz doll line as Barbie’s 
replacement, citing their racially plural “hipness” (187) 
as an alternative to what is undoubtedly Barbie’s stodgy 
white supremacist racial hierarchy. The differences 
between Barbie and the Bratz are numerous: Bratz are 
a group without the original or main figure that Barbie 
unquestionably is among her own crew; while Barbie’s 
figure is supposedly sexually innocuous despite 
her unrealistically hyperbolized womanly form, the 
exaggerated heads of the Bratz dolls suggest a cuteness 
that is undermined by their overtly sexualized postures, 
fashions, and facial expressions; Barbie embodies 
mainstream ideologies of naive niceness, while 
the Bratz are presented, particularly in the “Totally 
Tattoo’d” collection, as countercultural, subversive,  
and brazenly saucy. Most importantly to Guerrero,  
“[t]he dolls’ skins are darker than the traditional Barbie 
. . . ; their eyes are shaped differently; their lips are 
fuller; and their hair comes in varied shades of black, 
brown, and blonde, not just the one-size-fits-all blonde 
of Barbie” (189). 
The introduction, production, and development 
of these dolls is important, if only because they 
challenge the norms set out by figures like Barbie 
and allow children (and adults) of colour to feel 
represented and reflected in mainstream toy culture. 
At the same time, though, these dolls still operate 
within a discourse of deferral; they are alternates to 
the dominant, mainstream, and ubiquitous Barbie. 
Moreover, they repeat many of the problematic 
practices and narratives expressed by Barbie, including 
an essentialist reproduction of racialized cultural 
identities: for example, African American Sasha claims 
to love “street-style” and has aims to become a record 
producer, while Asian American Jade repeats model 
minority stereotypes when she declares that she loves 
to “spend hours at the chemistry lab.” Certainly, the 
four original Bratz are meant to represent four (multi)
racial identities—their obviously different skin tones 
allude to their racial heterogeneity—but in an almost 
ironic reversal of wannabe-ism, Yasmin, Cloe, Sasha, 
and Jade all possess the same exotic almond-shaped 
eyes, voluptuous lips, and haughty expression of 
indifference. Those Othered facial features, repeated 
across Bratz of supposedly different racial identities, 
have become a new norm. As Guerrero rightly points 
out, it appears that “[r]ace merely serves as another 
kind of ‘accessory’ that signifies ‘hipness,’ without 
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incurring the actual costs and consequences of real-
world racial signification” (190). Thus, once again, 
the problematic Black Barbie conundrum arises. 
Although Bratz dolls are marketed as a more elaborate 
interpretation of Otherness than Black Barbie, they still 
repeat outdated racial stereotypes and reiterate the same 
hegemonic systems of white supremacy and idealism. 
With their undeniable poise, intricate clothes and 
accessories, and relational proximity (or similarity) to 
their white doll counterparts, it is obvious that these 
playthings are scripted to be cherished, groomed, and 
desired. Black Barbies and Bratz dolls are marketed as 
beauty icons; the intended scripts direct their users to 
idealize and to honour them. Even though these dolls 
are no longer scripted within the framework of the 
innocent or violated figures that Bernstein sets up in 
her book, they invite a different use, one that mirrors, 
I think, the way in which white supremacy is scripted 
upon their existence. By this, I mean that these dolls 
invite a particular performative use, and that use is 
to highlight (and perhaps even to fetishize) racialized 
difference as something that can be purchased, 
obtained, and contained through acts of play. The 
new script, then, is one of exoticized difference, of 
deferred subjectivity; racial progressiveness can be 
purchased and played with, but the assumption is that 
the marketable difference is their capital cachet. Since 
difference is consumable here, it reiterates the white 
norm as the dominant, as the primary centre. 
As alternatives to the norm, Black Barbie(s) and Bratz 
dolls exemplify what has become scripted deferral in 
a North American multicultural ethos. Guerrero nicely 
summarizes this idea:
[A]s much as the [Bratz] dolls rely on images of 
difference, that difference relies on naturalized 
notions of whiteness. The dolls may be succeeding 
in presenting a new, and much needed idea of 
difference as beautiful and coveted, but that idea still 
exists in opposition to the “normal,” White beauty 
that Barbie, and the ideals reflected in her and her 
world, present. (194)
Included in Barbie’s white world is Black Barbie, the 
alternate, the supplementary, the Other whose scripted 
deferral reinforces the centrality and normativity 
of Barbie’s whiteness. The moniker alone—“Black 
Barbie”—implies her difference, her not-quite-
Barbieness. So while black dolls are not literally or 
symbolically scripted as unfeeling targets for abuse 
(that by extension deny subjectivity and innocence 
for the African American children they are meant to 
reflect) as do those objects described in Bernstein’s 
book, a different scripted violence is perpetuated by 
their positioning as ethnic alternatives. The deferred 
relationship between Barbie and her counterparts scripts 
racial inferiority upon those Other dolls and the subjects 
they are meant to celebrate and reflect.
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Of course, my reading of these dolls extends, 
perhaps too liberally so, beyond the scope of Bernstein’s 
study. In Racial Innocence, however, we get more than 
a historically grounded cultural reading of print and 
non-print texts. We get a framework through which 
we might think through a variety of objects in terms of 
their implications on childhood, race, and innocence. 
Most importantly, Bernstein reminds us that sentimental, 
picturesque, and childhood playthings are not benign or 
devoid of serious racialized implications. This  
critical book goes beyond the specific texts that its 
author addresses, although Bernstein does move 
between subjects with finesse and expertise; Racial 
Innocence casts a much-needed spotlight onto so 
many of the artifacts from our daily environments and 
invites us to problematize the ways that they have been 
scripted and the ways that we perform those scripts 
indiscriminately. 
Notes
 1 The book-and-doll legacy continues: Bernstein points out that, 
“[t]oday, book-doll combination sales have become the norm 
with product lines such as the American Girl Series . . . sell[ing] 
book-and-doll ensembles” that rely on a “mode of combination 
marketing of which Johnny Gruelle was an early virtuoso” (151).
 2 For more on Barbie’s recent transformations, especially in light 
of the more recent Bratz dolls, see Orr. 
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